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China Plays Hard Ball

European nations deep in debt are playing a dangerous game with China by teasing global markets. Neither borrowers nor would-be rescuers offer transparency about how much European debt China holds. Sensing that China is increasingly the only available willing buyer, leaders like Wen Jiabao allude to conditional lending, urging an end to anti-dumping charges or allowing asset sales that benefit Chinese trade. “If the eurozone’s less directly challenged economies pocket windfall benefits of quasi-zero interest rates for their own budgets, while denying support to less well-endowed economies, the eurozone will crack up,” warns China expert François Godement. China could be considering deleveraging its EU bond purchases, and no doubt, nationalistic Chinese citizens would appreciate Europe’s comeuppance. But the European Union is China’s top customer and a swift move toward belt-tightening would hurt the Chinese economy. Its growing division is weakening the EU. Markets will take advantage of the disorganization, and China will be looking for opportunities. – YaleGlobal

China Plays Hard Ball

As the EU wrestles with division over debt, China looks for opportunities
François Godement
YaleGlobal, 19 September 2011
The Chinese are coming! China's Premier Wen Jiabo asks Europe to widen its door for their exports; Chinese goods flow into Antwerp, Belgium

PARIS:  China could now be taking to Europe the hard game it’s played for some time with eurozone periphery states. In a recent speech to the World Economic Forum in Dalian, Premier Wen Jiabao asked Europeans along with the United States to “put their houses in order,” almost as a condition for China “extending a helping hand.” While there is no doubt that China holds 60 percent of its foreign currency reserves in dollars, statistics are unavailable in China or Europe to confirm that the euro accounts for up to 30 percent of its reserves, in fact leaving little room for other currencies such as the Japanese yen.

Wen came perilously close to asserting a political condition for that help, by noting that Europe granting market economy status to China would be “the way a friend treats another friend.”  In reality, the European Union would give up rights to bring anti-dumping charges against subsidized Chinese exports.

The quid pro quo was direct enough, unprecedented in China’s relations with either Europe or the United States. For some time, Europeans, caught in the debt crisis, had found bland expressions of support for the euro by Chinese leaders reassuring. And the governments struggling most have eagerly sought direct purchases of their national debt by China or even the psychological uplift of generic promises. In quick succession, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Hungary – the last unabashedly currying political favor from Beijing – have pleaded for China to rescue national budgets. The first publicly announced purchase of Spanish bonds in July 2010 did engineer a turnaround in market sentiment. For that reason perhaps, several governments – Spain, Hungary and now even Italy – have directly or indirectly overstated purchase commitments, bringing denials from Beijing, which steadfastly declines to cite figures in any case.

Beijing’s “support” has taken the form of asset buying in sectors designed to benefit the interests of Chinese enterprises.

Beijing’s “support” and “friendship” have actually taken the form of asset buying in sectors evidently designed to benefit future trade and the interests of Chinese enterprises. Container ports and terminals, airports and logistical or industrial assembly bases are targeted, besides firms with interesting technological or marketing content.

Nations have also been conditioned to move away from anti-dumping charges against China and towards support for its longstanding claim of market-economy status from Europe. Greece, Spain and Portugal, once vocal advocates of anti-dumping, have now fallen silent. Ironically, they may not support the efforts by some Northern European countries, including Germany, to improve access for their firms on China’s service and public procurement markets. China, which will get market economy status in 2016 in any case, is still hell-bent on removing any anti-dumping risk against its firms. Such removal is conditional on China respecting its terms of entry into the World Trade Organization: Some trade negotiators suggest a case exists for charging Chinese state firms with dumping for using state subsidies in their financing. So the issue is alive and well, not just a historical relic from China’s accession to the WTO in 2001.

China’s readiness to use the granting or denial of lending to governments as a credible weapon is far from certain. Opacity in numbers, the use of third markets and off-shore centers leaves much room for bluff. Despite earlier media hype, there is no sign that China has actively purchased bonds of crisis-hit countries. The Bank of China for example  – one of three main Chinese public actors in this game – actually decreased its ownership of Greek, Spanish and Portuguese bonds during the first half of 2011. Given Beijing’s obsession with losing out on its large currency reserves, cautiousness makes economic sense. It’s probable, but not certain, that China has been investing – in proportion with its rising tide of reserves, but not above that tide – in safer European public bonds from the core countries. Let’s remember, until the last few weeks, those bonds paid more than US treasury rates.  

Struggling EU governments seek
direct purchases of their national debt by China or the psychological uplift of generic promises.

Even so, we lack specifics. Wen merely declared last June in Budapest that China owned “not insignificant amounts” of euro reserves and “hadn’t cut back on our Euro holdings.” In the absence of more confirmations, the market lift from rumors of Chinese purchases has become short-lived, lasting but a few hours in Italy on September 13. The same day ended with a report that Chinese funds had in fact been window-shopping for potential asset purchases in Italy, an altogether different purpose. 

Wen’s public gambit could therefore be a bluff. China has excelled in public diplomacy of vague assurances designed to leverage its partners, accompanied by hard deals and asset purchases rather than gifts.  As long as the eurozone holds together, supporting a bipolar currency order – or a tripolar order if one includes the yuan in addition to the dollar and euro – is strictly in China’s interest, along with avoiding a major recession in its main overseas market.

But if China had decided to deleverage its euro reserves, Wen’ statement would also be setting the ideal pretexts. That he relays, however obliquely, political conditions for Europe is another disturbing sign of Europe’s collective weakness. Making Europe lose face would help satisfy Chinese public opinion, already fed daily with news about their nation’s rise.

Only 48 hours after Wen’s statement at the World Economic Forum, five major central banks stepped in to assuage the European banking system’s liquidity fears, immediately prompting a step back by China. Successive statements by its Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Commerce have pointed to support for the euro in China’s own interest – without citing the conditions laid down in Wen’s speech. It’s highly improbable that Wen misspoke. Statements of China’s top leaders are carefully phrased, especially on sensitive issues like China’s financial strategy. Rather, Europe’s urgency temporary receded; China could not press the conditions it might extract as a lonely savior.

Political unity is essential, lest other players take advantage of divisions. Europe seems to show that
it cannot get its act together.

The episode should serve as a warning to Europeans. Political unity is essential, lest other players begin to take advantage of the obvious divisions. If the eurozone’s less directly challenged economies pocket windfall benefits of quasi-zero interest rates for their own budgets, while denying support to less well-endowed economies, the eurozone will crack up. If the European Union’s management of its external economic relations – trade, investment, finance – can be held hostage over Europe’s incapacity to reach a collective deal on public debt, the fundamental justification for the Union will disappear. The one and only realistic argument that European sovereignty hawks have always held was that the European Union as such was not a viable or even legitimate political actor.

In today’s global currency wars, China is a unitary political actor and so is the United States, despite the transaction costs of its political democracy. Europe seems bent on making the political demonstration that it cannot get its act together. In the last few days, Germany’s government, usually credited with a sensible decision-making process, has exploded with contradictory statements on Greece, eurobonds and the European Central Bank, and the Union has displayed collective folly.

This period might one day go down in history books as the moment when politicians lost Europe.

If China is now moving its pawn across the chessboard, Europe has only itself to blame. The show of European disunity, the apparent ignorance of market play by the leaders of Europe’s core economy, is staggering. China’s national interest alone dictates that the proceeds from its trade surpluses and hot money inflows must at least be partially invested into the euro. But Europe’s weakness invites into the game irrational market sentiment and potential heavy-handed pressure by a better organized player. 



François Godement is senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and the founder of Asia Centre in Paris.
Rights:Copyright © 2011 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization

Comments on this Article

21 September 2011
To be quite fair, Europe had been the worst violators human, sovereign, and commercial rights in history. The Imperial Garden, burned to charcoal, is history's testament to that. We can put aside it but we will never forget, unless it shall happen again.
However, that said, it is in China's interest to help Europe to the extent that is possible and reasonable and in keeping with its obligations to its own citizens. Europe in the meantime has to abandon its many unfair practices. First of all, recognize China as a market economy. China had been more market oriented than Europe in the last 20 years; if anything China had been the wide, wide western frontiers, like what the Americans likes to say, of market capitalism in our time, Europe had been the stalled Socialist backwater with total breakdown of market discipline in many decades, and America is already heading in that direction. Second, Europe has to repeal its sanctions on Military commerce with China. That sanction had been good to China, it forced them to develop indigenous military capabilities, but it is an indignation on anyone's conscious sight. Third, Europe has collectively guarantee the investment of China in real assets, hotels, real estate, shares, etc. not just sell some paper promises.
-Huyu , Beijing
19 September 2011
19 September 2011
It's not merely a global currency war which we witness today but we witness War. If China is to under-right budgets of European countries, as it has been substantially been under righting the US budget, what is left? China de facto buys the independence of these countries. so why should it go to conventional war against them? No one fights its own bought allies. Seems like conventional wars will soon become redundant. Armies will need to be disbanded by the West and funds saved can then be used to balance budgets.
A grim scenario for the West.
-Tirlochan Singh , India