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The Islamic State Wants the West to Over-React and Hasten Apocalypse

The Islamic State’s brutality has shifted targets – from expanding territorial control for a so-called caliphate in the Middle East to inspiring random attacks on soft targets in the West. The terrorist group emerged during Syria’s civil war, initially targeting Shia and other Muslims who resisted the primitive beliefs. By 2015, air attacks by the United States, Jordan and other nations combined with an offensive by Kurdish ground troops slowed the territorial expansion, pushing the jihadists from key cities like Kobani. Recruitment of foreigners fell, and many jihadists have tried to flee. The Islamic State yearns for a war between the West and Islam. Relying on social media, the extremists incite supporters to launch attacks anywhere in the world, as indicated by mass killings in Paris and San Bernardino, California. The Islamic State hopes to goad the United States and other countries to crack down on Muslims, prompting anger, fear and new waves of recruits for an apocalyptic battle anticipated by fundamentalists. Terrorism expert David Rapoport warns that over-reaction to terrorism, while common, could be disastrous. – YaleGlobal

The Islamic State Wants the West to Over-React and Hasten Apocalypse

Islamic State strategy shifts from territorial control territory to random attacks, drawing over-reaction and recruits
David C. Rapoport
YaleGlobal, 8 December 2015
Itching for a fight: The first issue of the Islamic State’s English language magazine Dabiq shows apocalyptic battle with a Christian West, top; Paris stadium following the November attacks

LOS ANGELES: The horrifying attacks in Paris indicate that the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or Daesh, has shifted strategy. While ISIS harshly condemned Western secularism, originally it did not attack many Westerners. The first US victim was journalist James Foley in August 2014, and afterwards nine hostages from the West and Japan, largely journalists and aid workers living in Syria, were beheaded when demands to Western states to halt air assaults were not met. The gruesome displays were viewed globally and managed by an executioner who spoke with an English accent.

ISIS now goes online encouraging supporters to launch their own attacks anywhere in the world – and the group has claimed responsibility for attacks in Paris, Egypt, Turkey, Tunisia and, most recently, San Bernardino, California. A growing apocalyptic vision of creating a new world under Islam may be the most plausible reason for the shift in strategy. ISIS anticipates that the new strategy could threaten security for Muslims in the West, helping stimulate more ISIS recruits while unifying Islam. 

The Paris attacks were designed to be random – nine coordinated strikes on easy-to-access sites including a stadium, concert hall and several restaurants. The sites chosen enabled ISIS to kill as many as possible and target a style of life the extremists consider reprehensible. The attacks contrasted dramatically with another in January by two Al Qaeda members who killed 12 persons associated with the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo for offensive descriptions of Prophet Mohammed. Comparing the two events, US Secretary of State John Kerry said the Charlie Hebdo attack had a “particularized focus and …rationale that you could attach yourself to somehow and say. Okay, they’re really angry.” One could understand that satirizing the religion's founder would infuriate Muslims, and many non-Muslims considered such ridicule inappropriate, too.

The Islamic State is intent on completing a 2009 plan to gain control of a caliphate and produce an apocalypse.

In Syria the primary aim of rebel groups is to overthrow the dictator Bashar al-Assad. ISIS is the primary exception, devoted instead to completing a 2009 plan to gain control of Syrian and Iraqi territories, designated as a caliphate, and produce an apocalypse as described in the Bible. 

ISIS has provided no explanation for launching the attacks in Paris that encouraged powerful foreign secular states to get more deeply involved in the Syrian conflict. Since the West is a major enemy, the decision was probably inevitable, though that does not explain the timing. 

Political and apocalyptic factors in the terrorism group’s recent history help answer this question. The belief that a new world was being created attracted Sunni recruits from around the globe. In June 2014, when the caliphate came into existence, ISIS had 6,300 fighters. In the next six months around 15,000 foreigners arrived, according to the UN, and the CIA estimated ISIS probably had 31,500 members altogether. Most men came intending to be fighters, and many women came to live in the new state, marry and have children. In 2015 ISIS governed up to 8 million people in a territory larger than the United Kingdom. Seizing gas and oil resources enabled it to meet what it regarded as charitable obligation, the third pillar of Islam, by providing food, transportation, housing and schools.

Al Qaeda once recognized ISIS as an affiliate, but now denounces the group as “seditious.”

A few groups in other Muslim areas like Boko Haram in Africa identified with ISIS. But Al Qaeda, which had once recognized ISIS as an affiliate, denounced the group in May 2013 as “seditious.” Sheikh Abdu Salam, an Al Nusra Front leader, Al Qaeda's Syrian franchise, said: "They assault Muslims, and their ideology completely drifted from the Sunni ideology that we follow, so we have to fight them."  In 2014 Al Nusra initiated a variety of violent attacks near Aleppo forcing ISIS to withdraw from the eastern province of Deir ez-Zor. Ironically, these battles led some analysts, including former CIA head David Petraeus, to suggest that the United States and “moderate” Al Qaeda members could sometimes be “allies.”

Enormous difficulties emerged by 2015. ISIS no longer could expand its territory. Foreign recruit numbers dropped. Turkey tightened border controls. Many foreigners left. ISIS beheaded about 100 foreign fighters attempting to desert. Many foreign women returned home, upset by how ISIS regulated marriages. The United States bombed ISIS oil sites, reducing revenue for services. Kurdish forces cut principal supply lines and regained some territory lost, including the important city of Kobani in January. Iraqi military forces then recaptured Tikrit in March. ISIS suggests that Shiites and Alawites, a Shia offshoot, living in the caliphate’s territory “pervert” the Koran, and contended they must be killed. Sunni Muslims in the territory opposing the caliphate received the same treatment.  A UN report estimated that nearly 15,000 civilians were killed in Iraq for 16 months starting in January 2014, and ISIS was responsible for the overwhelming majority of deaths.

Ten days before the Paris attacks, one Chinese and one Norwegian hostage were killed when their countries refused to pay ransoms. Ransoms are no longer a financial resource for ISIS. More countries banned them, and insurance companies, a chief source for funding, discouraged ransom payments.

Considering these compounding challenges, one might assume ISIS would avoid tangling with powerful foreign states. But that did not happen. Days before the recent Paris attacks, an ISIS affiliate took credit for destroyed a Russian passenger plane killing 234 persons. Russia then changed its policy of targeting rebels in Syria battling Assad and attacked ISIS in Iraq for the first time, bombing its oil sites.

Perhaps ISIS was inspired by memories of how the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 induced thousands of foreign Muslims to join the resistance swelling the ranks of Al Qaeda, ISIS’s predecessor in Iraq. ISIS may even assume that involvement of foreign secular powers might prompt Al Qaeda to once again become a crucial ISIS ally. Perhaps ISIS expected that Western governments, remembering the disastrous decision to invade Iraq, would continue to avoid invading Syria. But these political and military reasons for a new strategy seem weak and it would seem more practical for ISIS to keep the conflict local. 

Instead, ISIS’s religious beliefs may be behind the new strategy. 

Since the 1st century many Jewish, Christian and Islamic apocalyptic groups have turned to terror, a tactic not bound by pre-existing norms, because they wanted to create a “new world” – consistent with the religious belief that God’s violence would be wholly indiscriminate.

The 2003 invasion of Iraq revived intense apocalyptic beliefs among some Sunnis.

The 2003 invasion of Iraq revived intense apocalyptic beliefs among some Sunnis. Although the war did not bring divine intervention, it stimulated foreign recruits, a process that encourages apocalyptic groups to persist. Many believe that divine intervention is more likely if they endure intense suffering. 

The Hadith, a collection of sayings from Prophet Mohammed, identified the village of Dabiq in Syria as the place where the final battle in this world would be fought. ISIS captured Dabiq, in northwest Syria, in August 2014, a crucial event for its apocalyptic goals. ISIS named its English magazine after the city, and Dabiq was the scene of a video displaying an American aid worker’s severed head and announcing, “Here we are, burying the first American Crusader eagerly waiting for the remainder of your armies to arrive."

Religious beliefs explain why ISIS wants the West to invade Syria – the apocalypse will occur and eternal life in paradise will begin.

The San Bernardino attack has unleashed extraordinary anxieties. Such over-reactions to terrorism, while common, can be disastrous, offering a reminder on how World War I began.

David C. Rapoport is professor emeritus of political science at UCLA, and founding and chief editor of the scholarly journal Terrorism and Political Violence. He is the author of six books and is preparing another based on his article, “Four Waves of Modern Terror,” to be published by Columbia University Press. 

Rights:Copyright © 2015 YaleGlobal and the MacMillan Center

Comments on this Article

12 December 2015
It is not only the Islamic State that wants this war as the Georgia guide stones indicate keep the population to 500 000 000 which calls for a major depopulation.
-Martus , It is not only the Islamic
11 December 2015
Goading the superpowers into war? We should know all the angles, even this one.
-Beano McReano , Goading the Goats
9 December 2015
Professor Rapoport’s YaleGlobal piece shares much with the analysis of al Qaeda as a warring sect that I developed in Apocalypse: From Antiquity to the Empire of Modernity (Polity 2009) [available at].
IS wants to draw the US into an apocalyptic war, just as al Qaeda did. But there are important differences that have been widely noted, and they are chilling in their implications. First, IS holds territory, giving it a stronger basis for want satisfaction [mostly through oil revenues], recruitment, training, and strategic operations. Second, whereas al Qaeda was structured as a ‘sect’ with relatively close control of doctrine, operations, and personnel, IS is more organizationally akin to an apocalyptic warring ‘church’ in its organizational structure [following Troeltsch and Weber’s long-standing typological distinction], and this opens it to much broader recruitment and to supporting affiliate and ‘lone wolf’ actions. And third, although both al Qaeda and IS have construed war in terms much broader than military ones, including assassination of aid workers and civilians, IS has pursued violence as a violent spectacle [e.g., beheadings] in ways that al Qaeda seems eventually to have rejected.
The possibilities of apocalyptic war as a social phenomenon are manifold, and they are complexly tied to apocalyptic ideology and religious theology more generally, but neither is reducible to the other. Strategy to counter IS, by the same token, should not be reduced to either military force or a ‘battle for hearts and minds.’ Rather, it needs also to consider the unfolding trajectories of apocalyptic war and their dénouements.
-John R. Hall , Rapoport, IS, and apocalyptic war
8 December 2015
Excellent article from a renowned author
-Anne Speckhard , Excellent article from a
8 December 2015
Great piece. Obama needed to read this, and to have included the data re desertions etc. Maybe we could just isolate and ignore ISIL. Let them have their putrid "state." It would collapse of its own internal contradictions?
-Ivan Strenski , Ignore them?