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Home > IMF to the Aid of Ukraine: Well-Intended, But Misguided

IMF to the Aid of Ukraine: Well-Intended, But Misguided

Ukraine, battling separatists and demands for autonomy in its eastern regions, confronts a debt crisis. The International Monetary Fund approved $17.5 billion over four years and also called for another debt operation. After five months of negotiations, Ukraine received another $15.3 billion, including a 20 percent “haircut” in the $18 billion of bonds held by the private creditors. More than three quarters of the country’s 2015 external debt is privately held “Agreement may have been reached but that should not mask the fact that, like much of the IMF program, the ‘debt operation’ is misguided, a short-term fix that will prove to be costly over the longer term,” argues David R. Cameron, professor of political science and the director of Yale’s Program in European Union Studies. The structure of the deal could delay structural reforms and discourage investors. Cameron expresses doubt that Ukraine’s economy will grow at rates as predicted by the IMF and anticipates additional bailouts will be needed. He points out that the United States and the European Union have a strong geopolitical interest in Ukraine. – YaleGlobal

IMF to the Aid of Ukraine: Well-Intended, But Misguided

Ukraine struggles with separatists, protests, reforms – and an IMF debt deal on shaky ground
David R. Cameron
YaleGlobal, 3 September 2015
Time for a bailout: IMF’s Christine Lagarde with Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko, top; Ukraine’s ailing industry and illusory growth

NEW HAVEN: Ukraine’s war with pro-Russian separatists in its easternmost regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, started soon after Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014, has cost more than 6,000 lives and displaced more than a million. The war also damaged or destroyed much of the housing stock, infrastructure and productive capacity in its industrial heartland and sent the economy into a freefall. The gross domestic product dropped by 7 percent last year and is projected to drop another 9 percent this year. Facing a projected balance of payments deficit of $10 billion this year, the country entered 2015 on the verge of bankruptcy and desperately needing assistance.

In March, the International Monetary Fund approved Ukraine’s request for $17.5 billion over four years through its Extended Fund Facility – which allows a longer payment period for structural reforms – something it had refused to do in 2013. That refusal led then-President Viktor Yanukovych to seek and obtain financial assistance from Russia, in turn prompting violent protests in Kiev. The parliament removed Yanukovych, and Russia, declaring his removal a coup d’état, took control of and annexed Crimea.

While the IMF agreed to provide $17.5 billion, it also estimated that Ukraine faces a larger external financing gap of $40 billion. The IMF called for a “debt operation” – a restructuring of the debt held by private sector creditors that would provide $15.3 billion toward covering that gap.

Thursday last week, after five months of stalemated negotiations, Ukraine announced it had reached an agreement with an ad hoc committee representing its largest external private-sector creditors to restructure their holdings. Finance Minister Natalie Jaresko announced the committee had agreed to a 20 percent “haircut” in the $18 billion of bonds held by the private creditors, a deferral of four years in redemptions and a reduction of the coupon on all debt to 7.75 percent. Together, those measures are expected to provide the $15.3 billion called for by the IMF.

The Ukrainian government, the IMF
and the US government celebrated a “debt operation” for Ukraine.

The Ukrainian government, the IMF and the US government, which supported Ukraine in the negotiations, celebrated the completion of the “debt operation.” If not celebrating, the more farsighted creditors could at least console themselves that the “haircut” was only 20 percent rather than the 40 percent Ukraine had insisted upon throughout the negotiations. And they could also find consolation that the deal already increased the value of their holdings, providing a possibility of recapturing some of their losses if Ukraine’s GDP grows above an annual rate of 4 percent after 2020.

Agreement may have been reached but that should not mask the fact that, like much of the IMF program, the “debt operation” is misguided, a short-term fix that will prove to be costly over the longer term. The deal looks good for now; without it, Ukraine would have had to declare a debt moratorium that would have triggered a default. But with an economy in freefall and in need of substantial investment, Ukraine cannot afford to scare off potential investors.

With an economy in freefall, in need of substantial investment, Ukraine cannot afford to scare off investors.

Moreover, Ukraine does not in fact face a $40 billion external financing gap over the next four years. The cumulative balance of payments deficit over the four years is projected to be $12.3 billion. That will be covered, with $5 billion to spare, by the Extended Fund Facility. The remaining $27.7 billion of the projected gap consists of a buildup of official reserves to bring them up to the IMF’s metric standard for reserve adequacy. That’s a laudable objective. But rather than giving the country’s external private creditors a substantial “haircut,” the IMF should have encouraged Ukraine to do that through its economic and trade policies. The “debt operation” will inevitably reduce if not eliminate any incentive for the government to undertake those policies.

That is not the only disincentive created by the IMF program. Because of the magnitude of this year’s projected payments deficit, the EFF is heavily front-loaded: Ukraine will receive $10 billion this year and $2.5 billion in each of the next three years. As a result, it will receive a substantial portion of the assistance before it implements the many much-needed financial, fiscal, structural, administrative and governance reforms required as conditions for the assistance. While understandable given the projected payments deficit, the front-loading will inevitably reduce the incentive to implement those reforms.

At the end of 2014, the ratio of Ukraine’s public and publicly-guaranteed debt to its gross domestic product was 73 percent – less than the ratios in France, the UK, Germany and many other European countries. Largely because of a steep depreciation of the currency in February, which dramatically increased the amount in hryvnia of the public debt, two-thirds of which is denominated in foreign currencies, the ratio is expected to increase to 94 percent this year. That would still be sustainable if, as the IMF predicted, the economy grows by 2 percent next year, 3.5 percent in 2017, and 4 percent a year in 2018-20.

Such estimates are illusory. Ukraine won’t attain those rates of growth. The program commits it to reducing its overall budget deficit from 10.3 percent of GDP last year to 7.4 percent this year, 3.9 percent next year, and less than 3 percent in 2018-20. The economy will not grow at 3.5 to 4 percent a year in 2017-20 if fiscal policy is contractionary this year and during each of the next five years. The IMF may have learned little from its experience with Greece; prolonged fiscal contraction inevitably, without exception, causes prolonged economic contraction.

Six consecutive years of fiscal contraction will cause the economy to continue to contract, causing the deficit to exceed the target figures and require additional financial assistance. Before long – probably by late next year or in 2017 – it will become apparent, just as it became apparent in Greece only a year after its 2010 bailout, that it needs a second bailout – one that will no doubt be accompanied by another round of “haircuts” for the private creditors. As in Greece, Ukraine may well need a third bailout sometime thereafter.

Most striking: how little the United States and the European Union have done to support Ukraine financially.

US Secretary of the Treasury Jacob J. Lew, Treasury Under-Secretary for International Affairs Nathan Sheets, and other US and European officials supported Ukraine in its negotiations with the creditors and loudly applauded last week’s deal. Yet what is most striking is how little the United States and the European Union have actually done to support Ukraine financially. The EU has committed $1.8 billion this year and $700 million next year through its Macro-Financial Assistance program. Compare that with the hundreds of billions it has poured into Greece. The US has committed even less – only $2 billion in loan guarantees this year and nothing thereafter.

For all their rhetorical support for Ukraine in its conflict with Russia and its surrogates last year and in the recent debt negotiations, that support appears to have been, quite literally, nothing but cheap talk. It is as if the European and American governments have forgotten that they have a long-term economic and geopolitical interest in Ukraine.

David R. Cameron is a professor of political science at Yale University and the director of Yale’s Program in European Union Studies.

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Comments on this Article

5 September 2015
-- Donald Trump the front runner for 2016 US Presidential Election during his last speech in a campaign rally washed his hands off Ukraine and ditched European & NATO Allies in favor of Germany. To be fair to Trump he was rightly questioning the foreign policy of USA where many countries are being protected by USA namely South Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia etc without getting any money from them for this protection [though intriguingly Trump forgot to mention Israel which has been costing huge money and reputation to USA by supporting absurd unethical and impractical (even against all norms of international laws) two State solution]. But Trump was comparing apples and oranges when he compared these protected countries with Ukraine. This confusion of Trump is because he failed to grasp two points :-
(i)- Unlike these protected countries Ukraine is a legal international liability of USA under Budapest Memorandum 1994, which snatched nuclear weapons from Ukraine and
(ii)- The financial burden of retrieving Crimea from Russia and Donbass Region (Donetsk, Luhansk etc) from Russian supported rebels is on Russia and not on USA. Because war reparations will be paid by Russia which will take care of every expense USA & its NATO and other Allies would make in the war (if necessary) for restoring territorial integrity of Ukraine.
What is worse and extremely harmful for the future of USA is that Trump wants Germany (economically comfortable country of Europe but non-signatory of Budapest Memorandum) to do the needful in Ukraine matter which is as good as giving up the role of the leader of free world and ditching & abandoning Europe & NATO by USA in favor of Germany (which is yet to prove itself as one of the global leader who will use its military power for the benefit of mankind and not for its traditional fascist & genocidal purposes).
Trump evidently does not understand that so many things Americans take for granted (which make life worth living in USA) is the direct result of USA as leader of free world being perceived as dependable and supreme military power of the World. Therefore Trump and USA should be under no delusion. If USA does not take lead for restoring territorial integrity of Ukraine then nobody can stop the decline of USA in every sense of the term.
Regards
Hem Raj Jain
(Author of ‘Betrayal of Americanism’)
Pennington, NJ - 08534, USA. email: jainhemraj59@gmail.com
-hem raj jain , Trump on Ukraine
4 September 2015
The argument here seems to be for more assistance to Ukraine. So, what, 'we', and Ukraine, really need is even more "disincentive" to put its house in order - theftwise? It is being reported that recently 'unfrocked 'governor' of Donetsk Region Ihor Khomoliskiy is now safely ensconced in the USA, travelling on a 10 year visa with $1.8 billion of the first bail-out tranche, 'borrowed' by his bank for a now-coolapsed trade deal'.
-Baldurdasche , More 'Disincentive'?